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'Humanae Vitae,'
Natural Law, and Catholic Moral Thought
William E. May

The author is professor of Moral Theology at The Catholic University of
America, Washington, D. C, andformer book review editor for Linacre.

This paper will (I) present the context of "Humanae Vitae" and
summarize its principal teachings regarding the natural moral law; (2) set
forth the understanding of natural law common to those theologians
(hereafter referred to as "revisionists") who reject the specific teachings of
"Humanae Vitae"; (3) offer a critique of their conception of natural law;
and (4) present and defend an understanding of natural law rooted in the
thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, one shared, in large measure, by
theologians who accept the specific teachings of "Humanae Vitae".
"Humanae Vitae" and Its Context
Pope Paul VI's 1968 encyclical, "Humanae Vitae", did not emerge from
a void. In fact, it was eagerly anticipated. The Fathers of Vatican Council
II had observed, in a famous footnote to the chapter concerned with the
dignity of marriage and the family in "Gaudium et Spes", that, "by order of
the Holy Father, certain questions requiring further and more careful
investigation have been given over to a commission for the study of
popUlation, the family, and births, in order that the Holy Father may pass
judgment when its task is completed"l (emphasis added).
Since the views of this commission had been made public in 1967 and
since Pope Paul saw it necessary to reject some of these views, it will be
useful, before looking at the teaching found in "Humanae Vitae", to note
briefly what some of these views were . As we shall see, key claims made by
the majority members of this commission are central to the notion of
natural law advocated by revisionist theologians.
My concern here is with two claims made by the authors of the so-called
"majority reports" of the commission. In one of these reports, called
Documentum Syntheticum de Moralitate Regulationis Nativitatum in
Latin, the majority had this to say:
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To take his or another's life is a sin not because life is under the exclusive
dominion of God but because it is contrary to right reason unless rhere is quesrion
of a Kood of a hiKher order. It is licit to sacrifice a life for the good of the
community. It is licit to take a life in capital punishm ent for the sake of the
community' (emphasis added).

I call attention to this passage because the principle implicit in it, namely ,
that one can rightly destroy human life (or other human goods) provided
one does so for the sake of a greater good, is one that, as we shall see, looms
large in the conception of natural law advanced by revisionist theologians.
I call this the "Caiaphas" principle, although today it is more commonly
referred to as the "preference principle" or the "principle of proportionate
good".
In a second passage from the same document, the authors argue that a
married couple may rightly contracept individual conjugal acts so long as
these contracepted marital acts are ordered to the expression of marital
love, a love culminating in fertility responsibly accepted. The authors say:
When man intervenes with the procreative purpose of individual acts by
contracepting, he does this with the intention of regulating and not excluding
fertility. Then he unites the material finality toward fecundity which exists in
intercourse with the formal finalit y of the person and renders the entire process
hum an . . . Conjugal acts which by intention are infertile" or which are rendered
infertile [by use of artificia l contraceptives] are ordered to the expression of the
union of love; that love, however. reaches its culmination in fertility responsibly
accepted. For that reason other acts of union are in a sense incomplete and they
receive their full moral quality with ordination toward the fe rtile act .... Infertil e
conjugal acts constitute a totality with fertile acts and have a single moral
specifica ti on. namely. the fostering of love responsibly toward generous
fecundit y 4

This passage presents an understanding of the "totality" of human acts
that is , as shall be seen. quite central to revisionist theologians'
understanding of natural law. According to the argument given here. there
is a "material privation" (or what later will be termed "nonmoral,"
"premora l," or "ontic" evil) in contraceptive activity. However. the
contraceptive intervention is only a partial aspect of a whole series of
contracepted conjugal acts, and this entire ensemble "receives its moral
specification from the other finality, which is good in itself [namely. the
marital union] and from the fertility of the whole conjugallife".5 Or. to put
it another way , according to this argument, married couples who practice
contraception are not choosing to exclude children selfishly from their
marriage (or expressing, through their actions, what the authors elsewhere
characterize pejoratively as a "co ntraceptive mentality"." Rather, \I 'hat
they are doing - the moral "object" of their act - is to foster "love
responsibly toward a generous fecundity." But this is something good, not
bad.
These views formed part of the context surrounding the publication of
"Humanae Vitae". Pope Paul's responsibility was to pass judgment on the
work of the commission, i.e .. to determine whether or not the recom-
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mendations of its majority were compatible with natura l law precept s and
Church teaching. His purpose in writing the encyclical was to examine in a
fresh and deeper way the moral principles, rooted in natural law as
illumined by divine revelation , central to the Church's teaching on
marriage. 7 In unity with his predecessors R and, indeed , with Vatican
Council 11,9 he affirmed the competence of the Church's mag isterium,
divinely authorized to speak in Christ's name, to give an authentic
interpretation of natural law, which is an expression of God's will and
whose fulfillment is necessary for salvation W
Pope Paul , again in union with his predecessorsll and, indeed , the entire
Catholic tradition,l2 judged that the precepts of natural law demand that
every marital act must be open to the transmission of human life. ]J By this ,
he meant that universally binding precepts of natural law absolutely forbid
human persons to engage in any act, whether done in anticipation of the
marital act , in its accomplishment, or in the development of its natural
consequences, that proposes, "either as an end or as a means , to render
procreation impossible".1 4 Pope Paul thus taught that contraception and
contraceptive sterilization are always objectively morally bad actions,
contrary to natural law precepts or norms . He also taught, again in unity
with his predecessors and Vatican Councilll ,ls that "directly willed and
procured abortion" is another sort of human act that is always immoral
and opposed to universally binding precepts of naturallawY'
In his encyclical, Pope Paul alluded to the argument advanced in the
"majority" reports that individual marital acts can rightly be contracepted
so long as they are part of a "totality" ordered to the expression of marital
love and a generous fecundity. He firmly rejected this argument, along
with the view that one could justify deliberately contracepted marital acts
by appeal to the "lesser evil" . While recognizing that it is sometimes
permissible to tolerate a lesser evil in order to avoid a greater one or to
promote a greater good , he insisted that "it is never licit, even for the
gravest of reasons , to do evil so that good may come about", and cited St.
Paul (Rom 3.8) to illustrate this teaching. 17 Hejudged that it is never right
and consequently is contrary to precepts of natural law "to make into the
object of a positive act of the will something which is intrinsically
disordered and hence unworthy of the human person, even when the
intention is to safeguard or promote individual, fam ily , or social
well-being. IR
Clearly, in the mind of Pope Paul VI - and , indeed , in the mind of his
predecessors and Vatican Council 1119 - natural law includes among its
un iversa ll y binding precepts specific norms proscribing as absolute ly
immoral specifiable kinds of human actions which can be described
without using morally evaluative terms, and that among such actions are
contraception, contraceptive sterilization, and direct abortion. In his
judgment, such actions are intrinsically disordered or evil, and the free
choice to engage in them is always morally wrong and contrary to
universally binding natural law precepts or norms .
November, 1989

63

As everyone knows, the specific teachings of "Humanae Vitae" on the
absolute immorality of contraception, contraceptive sterilizat ion , and
abortion are rejected by many, including influential Catholic moral
theologians, while they are accepted by many others. It seems clear,
therefore, that theologians who reject specific teachings of "Humanae
Vitae" and those who accept them, entertain differing understandings of
natural law and its universally binding precepts. When the encyclical was
issued, it was criticized immediately by some revisionists as reflecting a
"physicalistic" or "biologistic" conception of natural law, one that erects
physiological structures as morally normative . 20 Yet this objection to the
encyclical does not go to the heart of the matter. At the heart of the matter,
as we shall see, is the claim , made by all revisionist theologians , that
natural law does not and cam,ot include specific, concrete, behavioral
norms, universally binding, which proscribe specifiable kinds of human
acts describable in morally nonevaluative language , such as norms
proscribing contraception, direct abortion, adultery, etc.
Theologians who assent to the specific teachings of "Humanae Vitae"
reject the claim of the revisionists . The crucial question concerns the truth
of this claim and its corresponding understanding of natural law. I shall
now turn to an examination of the thought of revisionist theologians in
order to set forth their understanding of natural law and its precepts.
2. The Revisionist Understanding of Natural Law
Although revisionist theologians (Backle, Curran, Fuchs, Haring,
Janssens, McCormick , Scholz, Schuller, and others) sometimes differ
among themselves on particular points , their basic understanding of
natural law and its precepts or norms is the same. They commonly hold, to
begin with, that two basically different kinds of norms or precepts belong
to natural law, namel y, formal norms and material norms.
According to these theologians , formal norms can in turn be divided
into two broad categories. Formal norms of the first and more important
kind affirm what our dispositions ought to be. "We call them formal,"
writes one of these theologians , Louis Janssens, "because our inner
attitude or disposition is the formal, animating element of our conduct".2 1
These formal norms express the qualities, attitudes , and dispositions that
ought to characterize the morally good person. They are not concerned
with human acts but rather with the being of the human person as a moral
being. They deal with what is morally good or morally bad. These norms
use virtue language and designate the morally good attitudes absolutely
essential for the morallife . 22 Examples of such norms are those calling us
to be loving, just, chaste, courageous, honest, etc. In a sense they are, as
Josef Fuchs puts it, "exhortations rather than norms in the strict sense".23
Such norms, Janssens says, "constitute the absolute element of morals .
For instance, it will always remain true that always and in all
circumstances we must be just, etc."24 These formal norms are thus moral
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absolutes, admitting of no exceptions. While these norms direct us to be
morally good persons, they are not concerned with the concrete content of
our actions , nor do they enable us to determine which actions we ought or
ought not to do. 25
A second type of formal norms is concerned with human acts and not
with the moral dispositions or attitudes of the person. These norms make
use of morally evaluative language in describing actions that we ought not
to do , that is , they employ terms "which refer to the material content of an
action but at the same time formulate a moral jUdgment" on the action . 26
For example , "murder" is a morally qualifying term affirming that a killing
(a descriptive term) is unjust and therefore morally wrong. Norms of this
kind - "It is wrong to murder, to have intercourse with the wrong person,
to take another's property unjustly," etc. - are a second type of formal
norms. Like the first type, these too are absolute and admit of no
exceptions. Yet they are tautological in nature and do not provide us with
any guidance in determining what specific kinds of killings are unjust or
murderous , what specific kinds of sexual relations are with the wrong
person , etc. As the revisionists say, these tautological formal norms are
"para netic," not instructive. They serve to remind us of what we already
know and exhort us to avoid morally wrong actions and engage in morally
right ones .27 These norms are self-evidently true and are universally
accepted by all who understand the meaning of the terms employed in
them.
Many revisionist theologians, it should be noted, hold that the terms
"good" and "bad" are properly used as predicates in morality only when
one is speaking of the being of the person as a moral being. The person is
morally good or morally bad, and formal norms of the first type direct the
human person to develop and acquire those dispositions and attitudes that
constitute him as a morally good being. According to these theologians,
the proper terms to use in referring to human action are "right" and
"wrong", not "good" and "bad". 28 Indeed, for revisionist theologians, a
human person can be morally good , by reason of his fundamental option
or exercise of basic freedom, and nonetheless freely choose to do actions he
knows to be objectively wrong, even seriously S029 But how do we know
which actions are morally right and which are morally wrong? In other
words , how do we come to know the material norms (sometimes called
concrete behavioral norms) which specify kinds of actions as morally right
or morally wrong, and what is the nature of these natural law precepts or
norms?
Norms Describe Kinds of Actions
Material norms describe in nonmorally evaluative language the kinds of
actions we ought or ought not to do. Examples are: one ought not to kill
the innocent; one ought not to lie ; one ought to keep promises. According
to revisionist theologians , these norms are known inductively by the
November. 1989
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collaborative exercise of human intelligence by persons living together in
society and reflecting upon common human experiences .3D These norms,
therefore , are affected by the historicity of human existence. They are by
no means merely subjective evaluations made by isolated individuals, for
human persons are by nature social beings who come to know the truth ,
including moral truth , only in fellowship with others . As Josef Fuchs puts
it, "There is a human orientation in moral questions only in terms of a
group , a community, a society, conceived as a whole."31 This does not ,
however, mean that the material norms of natural law are vitiated by a
radical cultural relativism. There is a transcultural standard which
overcomes such relativism, namely, "a steadily advancing 'humanization"' .32
What this means is that material norms are formulated by human persons,
reflecting deeply on shared experiences within communities , in an effort to
determine what kinds of human actions contribute to or militate against
the self-realization and fulfillment of human persons and societies. 33
Material norms of natural law, developed to the "truth" of the actions
they proscribe or prescribe as related to the "whole concrete reality of
man" and of the particular, historical society in which he lives. 34 But such
norms are not absolute in the sense that they are universally true
propositions about what human persons ought or ought not to do, about
which actions are "right" and which are "wrong." In fact, "A strict
behavioral norm , stated as a universal , contains unexpressed conditions
and qualifications which as such limit its universality."35 None of these
norms, in other words , is absolute ; all of them admit of exceptions. Since
they are known by a process of shared human reflections on human
experience in differing historical and cultural situations , it follows that
there are elements in this process that make it impossible for us to
articulate an absolutely irreversible determination of a concrete norm of
natural law. A major factor is the fact that human experience is an
on-going, open-ended reality. As a result , "We can never," as one
revisionist theologian says , "exclude the possibility that future experience,
hitherto unimagined , might put a moral problem into a new frame of
reference which would ca ll for a revision of a norm that , when formulated,
could not have taken such new experience into account". 36 Consequently,
these natural law norms are only "valid for the most part" 37 Some describe
actions that , for all practical purposes , ought never to be chosen freely by
morally good persons (for instance , one ought never to rape a retarded
child)38, and such norms can be regarded as "virtually exceptionless" or as
"practical absolutes" 39 Nonetheless , all material norms of natural law
must be considered , in principle, as open to exceptions and as revisable in
the light of ongoing human experience.
Material norms, while not absolute, are meant to instruct us about the
rightness or wrongness of human acts, that is, how these acts bear upon
human goods and values . It thus follows that in formulating such norms ,
all the human values and disvalues in the total situation must be taken into
account. Revisionist theologians maintain that these human values or
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goods and disvalues or evils are not, of themselves, moral in nature .
Rather, they constitute what these theologians call " premoral",
"nonmoral", or "ontic" goods and evi ls in distinction from moral good and
evil, which consists essentially in the goodness or wickedness of the person
as a moral being40 Thus life , health , knowledge, beauty , friendship, etc.
are "nonmoral" goods and their deprivations are "nonmoral" evils. The
critical question is how we are to determine, in developing materia l norms
of natural law and, indeed , in judging which acts are exceptions to these
norms, which acts are morally right and which are morally wrong, that is ,
which acts promote a nd enhance these nonmoral goods and values and
which d o not.
Recall now th e moral principle presented in the " Documentum
Syntheticum" of the majority part y of the papal commission on birth
reg ul a tion , namel y, that it is against right reason to take the life
(=nonmoral good) of an innocent person "unless there is question of a
good of higher order".41 RecalL too, that in the sa me report the majority
argued that a moral judgment about contraception could only be made in
ter ms of the purpose of contracepted marital acts and the whole of the
married life . The claim was made that if a couple deliberately contracepts
individual conjugal acts in order to express marital union and orders these
acts responsibly toward generous fecundity, one could rightly say that
what this couple was doing - the "object" of their moral act - was
"fostering love responsibly toward generous fecundity," even though this
entailed the "material privation" (=nonmoral evil) of individual acts of
their openness to human life .42 Josef Fuchs, it should be noted , was one of
the authors of this report. The rea so ning set forth in it foreshadowed the
thought of revisionist theologians with regard to the basic norm or
principle that ought to govern the development of material norms of
natural law and the disce rnment of human acts constituting "exceptions"
to them .
Operative Principle

As refined by revisionist theologians , the principle operative in
"Documentum Syntheticum" has become known as the "preference
principle" or "principle of proportionate reason." Schuller puts it this way:
Any ethical norm whatsoever regarding our dealings and omissions in relation to
other men ... can be only a particular application of that more universa l norm ,
"The greater good is to be preferred" 4.'

According to this principle it is morally right to intend a nonmoral evil,
such as the death of an innocent person, if this is required by a
"proportionately related good". Thus, as McCormick says ,
where a higher good is a t stake and the only means to protect it is to choose to do a
nonmoral evil. then the will remains properly disposed to the values constitutive
of human good .... This is to say that the intentionality is good even when the
person, reluctantly and regretfully to be sure. intends the nonmoral evil if a trul y
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proportionate reason (=good) for such a choice is present.'4

Revisionists maintain that this principle does not mean that a good end
can justify the means if the means in question is admitted to be morally
evil. But they hold that the intention and realization of a (nonmoral) good
can possibly justify the doing of any nonmoral evil. 45 The intending and
doing of this evil cannot be morally evaluated by itself, because "an action
cannot be judged morally in its materiality (killing, wounding, going to the
moon) without reference to the intention of the agent; without this, we are
not dealing with a human action , and only of a human action may one say
in a true sense whether it is morally good or bad"46
Material norms developed in the light of this principle are, as we have
seen, valid for the most part. That is , they are, in general , good norms to
follow in choosing what to do (e.g. , we ought not to lie, to break promises,
to kill innocent persons , to have sexual relations with some one other than
our spouses). But no norms formulated in this way are absolute. Any norm
formulated before the choice to be made has a certain generality.
Confronted with the actual situation, unforeseen factors may be found
which require an exception to a previously assumed norm .47 Thus,
although revisionist theologians say that some material norms can be
assumed to be adequately formulated and thus virtually exceptionless or
practically absolute, they deny that any norm can be assumed to be fully
adequate. They hold that it is always possible, at least in theory, for an act
contrary to such a norm to be justified in terms of a proportionately related
good. They also stress that cultures themselves gradually change and that
human nature, too, is historically conditioned and subject to change. 48
It thus follows that every material norm is subject to an exception
clause: it is wrong to kill innocent persons, to lie, to have sexual relations
with a person not one's spouse, etc., except when doing so is required in
order to achieve a proportionately greater good. Thus some acts of direct
abortion , mercy killing, contraception, etc. can be morally right acts,
provided they are done for the sake of a proportionate good. 49 Moreover,
when such acts are justified by a proportionately related good, the proper
way to describe them is not to call them acts of contraception,
contraceptive sterilization, or killing of an innocent person, but rather to
describe them as , in the case of justified contraception by married couples ,
"fostering love responsibly toward generous fecundity" or, in the case of
contraceptive sterilization, as "a marriage-stabilizing" act, 50 or, in the case
of an abortion to prevent the mother from suffering grave psychic harm, a
"life and health preserving act"51 insofar as these are the proportionate
goods justifying the acts in question .
Finally , revisionist theologians say that their understanding of the
material norms of natural law and of the principle of proportionate reason
is rooted in the Catholic tradition. They appeal , first of all , to the natural
law thought of St. Thomas Aquinas . Aquinas, they say, recognized that
the material norms of the natural law are valid only for the most part , that
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is, that these norms are , in general , valid and useful. However, in rare and
particular cases they may not be appropriate and actions contrary to them
may be morally right 52 Moreover, they maintain , for Aquinas even the
precepts of the second table of the Decalogue are absolutely indispensable
only when they are regarded "formally," that is, as forbidding actions that
are already known to be morally wicked , e.g., unjust killings , unwarranted
thefts , etc. If these precepts are considered "materially", that is , as material
norms proscribing killing, lying, taking what belongs to another, they are
not absolutely universal in scope , but admit of exceptions. 53 In addition,
they argue , Aquinas himself regarded the end for the sake of which an
action is done as its "formal" element , the one specifying the act done as a
moral act Y
They appeal , secondly , to the teaching of Vatican Council II, which
insisted 55 that some moral problems facing humankind are exceedingly
complex, that their resolution can be found only by the collaborative effort
of persons of good will working together, and that quite often, the answers
to them can only be tentative and inconclusive . 56
Thus the revisionist understanding of naturalla w. I next offer a critique
of this understanding .

3. Critique of Revisionist Natural Law Theory
The revisionist understanding of natural law is seriously erroneous. My
criticisms of it will be directed to the following elements in this theory: (A)
its claim that no specific natural law precepts ("material norms" for
revisionists) can be universally true because (i) unforeseen factors may
require exceptions to previously assumed norms, (ii) such norms are
historically and culturally conditioned; and (iii) human nature itself is
subject to change ; (B) the preference principle or principle of
proportionate good ; and (C) its use of sources such as St. Thomas Aquinas
and Vatican Council II. In concluding this section , I will also (D) argue
that revisionist theologians seriously misconstrue the nature of morality
and the relationship between human acts and salvation.
A. A central claim of revisionist theologians , as we have seen, is that
"We can never exclude the possibility that future experience, hitherto
unimagined, might put a moral problem into a new frame of reference
which would call for a revision of a norm that, when formulated, could not
have taken such new experience into account"57 This claim is supported,
revisionists say, by the culturally and historically conditioned manner by
which such norms are formulated 58 and by the fact that human nature itself
changes radically. 59
(i) . The argument that the ongoing, open-ended character of experience
precludes permanently true specific moral norms is perhaps true with
respect to some norms. But the argument assumes that an action can be
morally evaluated only as a totality which includes all the circumstances
and ends considered in relationship to all the nonmoral (but morally
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rele va nt) goods and bads involved in that totality, for the purpose of
identifying the behavior which will further man's self-realization and
self-development OO or which will not contradict or negate its own good
purpose. ol But thi s assumption does not stand up. It is , of course, in
ge neral true that the morality of a specific huma n act can be determined
only by taking into account it s object, end, and circumstances, for all must
be good if the act as a whole is to be morally good 62 But it is not true that
we cannot make a final, conclusive judgment about the wickedness of a
spec ific human act without taking all three of these factors into
consideration. For we know that if any of these elements is bad , the entire
a ct is vitiated. A ke y truth in natural law thought is the one attributed to
Pseudo-Dionysius, expressed summaril y as bonum ex inlegra causa,
malum ex quocumque deleelu. As St. Thomas put the matter:
Since it is o f the very essence o f the good tha t it be fullness of being. if there is
so me thin g lacking to anything pertainin g to it s fullness of bein g. that being
cannot be called good unreservedly but o nl y relatively. to the extent that it is a
bei ng.
. Thus we must say th a t eve ry ac ti o n possesses goodness to the extent
that it has being; but to the extent that there is lacking to it anything o f the fullne ss
of being that o ught to be presen t in human action. to th a t exte nt th e ac tion lac ks
goodness a nd is thus sa id to be bad ·]

Consequently, human acts already specified as morally wicked because
they are evil by reason of their objects , that is , by reason of the "d ue
matter" upon which the human will must bear 64 remain morally wicked
despite variable historical and cultural factors precisely because their basic
moral qualit y is identical with their constitution as human acts. Hence
they, and the norms bearing on them, are not open to a difficult evaluation.
If a relevant natural law precept proscribes a kind of action known to be
morally evil by reason of the "d ue matter" upon which the human will must
bear, no new existential situation can make that kind of action to be of a
different kind.
(ii). Revisionist theologians seek to avoid a radical cultural and
historical relati vism by appealing to the transcultural standard of "a
steadily advancing 'humanization'" or the self-realization of persons and
of the communities in which they live. 65 Nonetheless, this vague standard,
as Germain Grisez has noted , lacks the content "needed to determine what
should and what should not count as morally determinative when one fills
the formal concept of human self-realization with the whole concrete
reality of persons in society and their world".66 It is, of course , true that
man is a historical being and that morality is, to some extent , relative to
contingent social reality. For example, societies like individuals make
choices that both generate and limit moral responsibilities , new options
become available as societies develop , better factual judgments often lead
to new insight into moral obligations, moral insight is often blocked by
cultural biases and released by changed conditions, etc 67 But from this it
does not follow that all specific moral norms are relative to contingent
social reality.
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(iii). The claim is made that specific moral norms must be based on
concrete human nature and this nature (as opposed to "transcendent"
human nature) is subject to far-reaching change and therefore no specific
moral norms based on it can be universally and irreversibly true. 68 Those
making this claim, however, do not explain what "concrete" human
nature, as opposed to "transcendent" human nature, is. They in no way
explain how basic goods of human persons might cease to be good for
them or how their claim about change in human nature coheres with the
unity of the human race. They fail to show how this claim can be reconciled
with the truths, proclaimed by the Church, that "all human beings . . . have
the same nature and the same origin",69 a common nature, 70 and all have
the "same calling and destiny" and so , fundamentally equal both in nature
and in supernatural calling,? 1 can be citizens of the one People of God
regardless of race or place or time. 72 I n addition , the same sorts of goods
(life, knowledge of the truth , personal integrity, friendship, harmony with
God , etc.) are perfective of all human persons of all times and cultures and
races. As a consequence, it does not follow, from the fact that human
persons are historical and cultural beings , that all specific moral norms are
so conditioned historically and culturally that they must be open to
revision and exception in the light of changing historical and cultural
realities.
B. Revisionist theologians, as we have seen, contend that the basic
principle for developing specific moral norms (:::material norms) and for
determining which human actions are permissible exceptions to them is
the preference principle or principle of proportionate good. This proposal
has been subjected to devastating criticism by many, in particular,
Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, John Finnis, John Connery, Servais
Pinckaers, and Bartholomew Kiely.73 According to this principle, moral
judgments should be made by a comparative evaluation of the (nonmoral)
goods and evils promised by the various alternatives of choice. The
alternative promising the greater balance of nonmoral good over evil is the
alternative that ought to be chosen; it is, in other words , the morally right
action or sort of action .
This proposal has some plausibility. The proposal - namely, to choose
that alternative which promises the greater proportion of good over evil seems self-evident , for the alternative seems to be that we ought to choose
the a lternative promising the greater proportion of evil over good, and this
is absurd . I ndeed , one of the leading revisionists , Richard McCormick, has
stressed the apparent self-evidence of this norm. He puts it negatively to
show how it is used in "conflict" situations, that is, situations in which both
good and evil inevitably result, and are foreseen to result, from the action
we choose to do . "The rule of Christian reason," McCormick says, "if we
are to be governed by the ordo bonorum. is to choose the lesser evil. This
general statement , it would seem , is beyond debate, for the only alternative
is that in conflict situations we should choose the greater evil, which is
patently absurd". 74
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Proportionalism 'Incoherent, Unworkable'

Despite this initial plausibility , however, proportionalism as a method
for making moraljudgments is unworkable and incoherent. The claim that
it is self-evident does not stand up under sc rutin y. Its plausibility rests on
the ambiguity of the word "good". The morally upright person surely seeks
to do the greater good, in the sense of what is morally good. Yet the
revisionists claim that it is poss ible to determine , prior to choice , which
among diverse alternatives is morall y good by bala ncing or measuring or
commensurating the nonmoral goods and evi ls tha t one's freely chosen
acts will cause. The problem here , as Finnis , Boyle , and Grisez above all
have shown ,75 is that there is no unambiguous or homogeneous measure
according to which the goods in question (goods such as human life itself,
health, knowledge , beauty, friendship , etc.) can be compared . Although
none is the absolute good , in the sense of the highest good or Summum
Bonum . each is trul y a priceless good of human persons and as such , a
good to be prized , not priced - a good participating in the incalculable
goodness of the human person. To attempt to measure them off against
each other, to commensurate them, is like trying to compare the number 84
with the length of my arm. One simply cannot do so. One could if the y were
reducible to so me common denominator , as one can compare the number
84 with the length of my arm if one compares them in terms of a common
denominator such as centimeters , a scale adopted not by discovering a
truth but sheerly by an arbitrary act of the will. But the goods involved in
moral choices cannot be reduced to a common denominator. They are
simply different and incomparable goods of human persons . Thus the
presupposition upon which this revisionist "principle" relies is false . One
cannot determine, in a nonarbitrary way, which human goods are
"greater" and which "less". They are all incomparably good, irreducible
aspects or dimensions of human flourishing and well-being. 7 ~ And the
same is true of instances of the diverse goods.
Very few revisionists have even attempted to answer this criticism . One
is McCormick. While most revisionists continue to claim that in making
moral judgments we must "commensurate" the goods and evils at stake in
the available alternatives , McCormick has been forced by this criticism to
admit that it is , in the strict se nse, impossible to commensurate goods of
different categories "against" each other. Yet he now says that "while the
basic goods are not commensurab le (one against the other), they are
clearly associated" or interrelated. Moreover, he continues , by considering
these goods in their interrelationship, one can judge that the deliberate
choice to destroy one good in present circumstances will not lead to an
undermining of that good and that its destruction or impeding here and
now is necessary in order to foster the flourishing of related goods,
including the good one chooses freely to destroy,?7
This response is simply not adequate. It comes down to saying that
although there is no nonarbitrary way to commensurate the goods, we
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nonetheless succeed in doing so by associating them . McCormick himself
admits as much , for he speaks of assessing the greater good as a "prudent
bet" and of commensurating "in fear and trembling" and doing so by
adopting a hierarchyJ8
What he is , in fact , doing by saying this is admitting that we
commensurate the goods by choosing or stating our preferences. But the
problem this revisionist principle was advanced to solve was that of
determining, prior to choice , which possibilities are morall y good and
which are morally bad. Now McCormick tells us that to commensurate the
goods , we must choose a hierarchy among them. This simply will not do ,
nor does it respond to the criticism that the goods in question are simply
not commensurable in the way the revisionist " principle" requires them to
be J 9
Position Requires Re-description
Moreover, this position requires us to redescribe our actions in terms of
their anticipated results. Note that revisionists describe a series of
contracepted marital acts as "fostering love responsibly toward a generous
fecundity" and contraceptive sterilization as a "marriage-stabilizing" or
"family-stabilizing" act. That is like describing the act of a prostitute who
engages in her trade in order to support herself and her children as an act of
"earning a living". It conceals , rather than reveals, what the person is
doing.
Finally, as Bartholomew Kiely has noted ,8 1this revisionist principle fails
to consider seriously the reflexive or immanent consequences of human
acts as self-determining choices. We make ourselves to be the persons we
are because of the actions we choose to do. In choosing to do evil, even for
the sake of a "greater good ", we make ourselves to be evildoers. A
ciearheaded utilitarian consequentialist , incidentally, Gregory S. Kavka,
recognizes this problem. He believes that it is morall y right, indeed
necessary , to maintain a nuclear deterrent whose credibility entails the
willingness , however reluctant , to kill millions of innocent persons. Yet he
thinks that this involves a "paradox"; it is morally right "for a rational and
morally good agent to corrupt himself' deliberately by willing, albeit
conditionally, a terrible evil , the death of innocent persons. 82 Revisionist
theologians , no doubt because they sharply distinguish between free
choice and what they term one's fundamental option, do not even see this
problem .
C. Revisionist theologians also misinterpret St. Thomas and Vatican
Council I I. Repeatedl y referring to the texts in which Aquinas says that the
more remote precepts of the natural law are valid "for the most part", but,
on rare occasions are deficient ,8) revisionists claim that he regarded all
specific moral norms as open to exceptions . Yet St. Thomas makes it
abundantly clear that in his judgment many specific natural law precepts
are absolute and that certain specifiable human actions are always
contrary to them . Among the sorts of human acts that are always morally
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wicked are stealing,84 lying,85 fornicating, 86 adultery,87 and the killing of
innocent persons. 88 By adultery, too , he (along with his predecessors)
meant sexual union between two persons, at least one of whom is married
to another; he did not mean , as some revisionists do , sexual union with the
wrong person. Thus , when St. Thomas confronted the opinion of
Aristotle's Anonymous Commentator that adultery (intercourse with a
tyrant's wife) is permissible when done to save a nation from tyrann y, he
curtly noted: "i1le Commentator in hoc non est sustinendus; pro nulla enim
utilitate debet aliquis adulterium committere".89
Revisionist theologians likewise contend that Aquinas's position on the
nondispensability of the precepts of the Decalogue simply means that
actions already morally evaluated (e.g., murder or unjust killing) are
prohibited by formal norms, not "material" norms or specific moral
norms. 90 Yet St. Thomas's own treatment of this issue shows clearly that,
in their most precise and true meaning, the precepts of the Decalogue
specify acts by reference to the agent's proximate intention - the moral
object the agent chooses - acts subject to no exceptions even by divine
will. The moral object of the acts identified by these precepts is specified
descriptively as "taking what belongs to another" , "killing the innocent",
"coition with someone who is not one's own" and not in morally evaluative
terms .91 Aquinas makes it clear, for instance, that when Abraham was
willing to sacrifice Isaac because of God's command, Abraham's human
act can not be rightly said to be the killing of an innocent person, but rather
a carrying out of God's just judgment on a sinner. God's command
changed the situation , not by dissolving the obligation of a norm
(voluntarism) but by creating conditions in which the object of Abraham's
chosen act is different. In short, Abraham did not choose to kill an
innocent person; rather, he chose to execute God's just judgment.
Similarly, revisionists say that Aquinas regarded the end as the formal
element specifying human acts and that , consequently, he held that an
action really willed and done coherently for the sake of a good end must be
morally right.92 In reply, it must be noted that St. Thomas made it
abundantly clear that the end specifying the human act includes not only
the agent's ultimate purpose or purposes but also the precise object of the
agent's will, that is, the proximate object of his will. Thus an act cannot be
morally right unless both the ultimate end(s) and the chosen means
(proximate end or object) are in accord with right reason. Some acts,
specified by the objects of choice or proximate ends of action (e.g., killing
the innocent, intercourse with someone who is not "o ne's own"), can never
be in accord with the natural law precepts. 93

Assertions of Revisionist Theologians
As we have seen , revisionist theologians assert that Vatican Council II
supports their claim that no specific moral norms can be universally true.
To support this claim they refer to passages in which the Council Fathers
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speak of the complexity of moral issues, the fact that the gospel does not
provide us with answers to all problems, the need to collaborate with
people of good will in finding solutions to pressing issues of our day , and so
forth 94 But in appealing to Vatican Council II, revisionists are se lective
and ignore passages impo ss ible to reconcile with their theory. Thus , for
instance , the y pass by in silence the text from "Gaudium et Spes" in which
the Council Fathers , a fter reminding men of "their permanent binding
force of universal natural law and its all-embracing principles," teach that
"actions which deliberately conflict with these same principles . .. are
criminal",95 and then declare that "every act of war directed to the
indiscriminate destruction of whole cities or vast areas with their
inhabitants is a crime against God and man , and merits firm and
unequivocal condemnation".96 They likewise ignore the teaching of
"Gaudium et Spes" that "all offenses against life itself, such as murder,
genocide, abortion, euthanasia , and willful self-destruction . . . are
criminal; the y poison ci vilization, and they debase the perpetrators more
than the victims and militate against the honor of the creator"97 Although
so me actions condemned absolutely in this passage are described in
morally evaluative terms (e.g. , murder) , and would thus fall under the
tautological formal norms recognized by revisionists, others are described
in morally neutral terms (e .g., abortion, willful self-destruction,
euthanasia). In short , Vatican Council II clearly taught that the natural
law embraces specific moral norms which are absolutely binding,
transcending historical and cultural situations and rooted in constitutive
elements of human nature and human persons 98
D. My final criticism of revisionist natural law theory is that it seriously
misconstrues the nature of morality and the relationship between our
everyday choices and sa lva tion . An indication of the problem in revisionist
thought on this matter is pro vided b y the fact that many , as we have seen,
in sist that the terms "good" and "evil" properly refer only to the human
person as moral subject, whereas the proper predicates to use in referring
to the morality of human acts are "right" and "wrong". According to
revisionists, formal norms, which are absolute, are primarily concerned
with the being of the human person as a moral agent, and such norms
exhort the person to acquire those dispositions and qualities characterizing
the being of an upright moral perso n. Material norms , on the other hand ,
are about human acts - they are judgements, valid for the most part , that
some sorts of acts are "right" and others "wrong". In addition, revisionists
maintain that a person freely choose to do a "nonmoral" evil for the sake of
a proportionately greater "nonmoral" good.
But, as noted already , revisionists fail to consider seriously the reflexive
or immanent character of human acts and the intimate relationship
between free human choices and the being of the acting person . At the core
of a human act is a free, self-determining choice that abides within the
person until a contradictory choice is made. In and through the actions we
freely choose to do, we give to ourselves a moral identity. When, for
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example, I choose to lie to my wife, perhaps about a minor matter and
perhaps because I hope by doing so to preserve the "greater" good of
family harmony, I make myself to be a liar, and I remain a liar until, by
another free choice, I become a repentant one. As Grisez, Kiely, Pinckaers
and others have shown , revisionist theologians reduce morality to its
effectiveness in bringing about benefits and avoiding harms , ignoring the
personal and interpersonal meaning that human acts , as self-determining,
have on the being of the acting person. 99
The revisionists' failure to take seriously the meaning of human acts as
self-determining choices is due, in large measure, to the acceptance by
most of them of a theory of fundamental option or basic freedom that
changes the locus of self-determination. They relocate self-determination
from the free choices we make every day, including such fundamental
choices as getting married or entering the priesthood, to an alleged exercise
of fundamental option or basic freedom at the core of our being in which,
supposedly, we take a stance "for" or "against" God and basic human
values . They even claim that one can freely choose to do something one
knows to be seriously wrong and nonetheless remain in God's
friendship ;lOo for instance, a married man may freely choose to commit
adultery, even without a "proportionate" reason, and still remain
fundamentally a morally good person. In short, for revisionists the
everyday actions we choose to do in exercising our "categorical" freedom
"horizontally" in our everyday relationships are of a fundamentally
different character from the option we make, seemingly without even
being consciously aware of doing so , deep within our being in our
"transcendental" relationship with God .
They maintain that our relationship with God, established by the
exercise of our fundamental option , is directly related to salvation. Our
everyday, "categorical" choices are , of course , also related to salvation.
Yet, in revisionist thought, they are so only indirectly, insofar as our many
acts of free choice must be integrated with our fundamental option and
bring it to maturity.101 But this is to consign the salvific to the
transcendental and to ignore the saving significance of innerworldly and
temporal actions.
Vatican Council II Affirmations

However, as the Fathers of Vatican Council II affirmed, Christians will
find perfected in heaven the very good fruits of human nature and work
which they nurture here on earth.I02 Thus revisionist natural law theory
leads to a reductionist spirituality at odds with the New Testament's
teaching that redemption includes all human goods and the cosmos itself
(see Rom 8.21; I Cor3 .22-23; Eph I. 10) and the teaching of the Church to
appropriate the whole universe into a new creation , beginning here and
now on earth and finding its fulfillment on the last day.IOJ
For the reasons set forth in this section, revisionist natural law theory
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must be judged seriously erroneous .
4. An Alternate Understanding of Natural Law

Theologians who assent to the s pecific teaching of "Humanae Vitae"
obviously understand natural law quite differently than do revisionist
theologian s. Although there are important differences among these
th eo logians , the y commonly see k to base their thought on the natural law
teac hing found in SI. Thomas Aquinas, whose work, so inherently
worthwhile and so warm ly commended by the Church's magisterium ,
including the Fathers of Vatican Counci l 11,104 they try to develop. It
therefore seems fitting to begin this section with a brief account of the
"structure" of naturalla was found in the thought of the Common Doctor.
According to Thomas, the rule for moral goodness is right reason . The
goodness of the will's acts d e pends on the goodness of its term or object.
Since th e will is an intellec tual appetite , inclining toward objects presented
to it by reason, " the goodness of the will depends on reason" . 105 Practica l
reason , moreover, ha s its own first principles; these a re the primary
precepts of naturallaw, ,06 which is the rational creature's unique way of
participating in God's eternal law . This eternal law is communicated to
human persons through their na tural inclinations and their reaso n, for
rational creatures participate in the eternal law not simply by being ruled
and measured by it , but a lso by actively ruling and measuring their own
ac tions in accord with its truth.l o7 They do so by coming to know the truths
of eternalla wand expressing these as "proposiliones" of prac tica l reason.
There is, moreo ver, an ordered progression in this active participation in
the truths of eternal law, for natural law consists of a n ordered series of
"p recepts" or propositions of practical reason.
The first set in this ordered se ries consists of " those common and first
principles",08 inscribed in reaso n as self-evidently true propositionsW 9
Among such common a nd first principles is that "good is to be done and
pursued and evil avoided" and all those precepts based on this ordi nation
of reason. IIO Therefore, "s ince good has the meaning of an end ... it
follows that reason naturally apprehends as good all those things to which
man has a natural inclination and consequently to be pursued in action,
and their contraries as evi ls to be avo ided"."1 Thomas lists so me of these
natural inclinations and the human goods to which the y orient us and
which reaso n naturall y grasps as goods to be pursued and done: the
inclinations to preserve one's life, to bear and raise children , to live in
fellowship with others, to discover the truth about God. The list is
illustrative , not taxative, something Thomas makes clear by such
expressions as "a nd ot hers of thi s kind".112 His point is th at the goods to
which we are directed by natural inclinations are grasped b y practical
reason as fitting objects of the will. They are goods perfective of human
persons and human perso ns are meant to flourish in them. Thus, among
the "first and common principles" of natural law are the precepts that
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human life itself, its handing on and education, knowledge of truth about
God , life in company with others and "other goods of this kind" are to be
pursued and their opposites avoided . The human person , through his will
and freely chosen human acts, must resepct these goods, for they are the
"ends" to which we are ordered. In fact , it is through the moral virtues that
we are well disposed to these goods or "ends".113
Precepts Included

Thomas also includes, among the primary precepts of natural law, such
precepts as "do evil to no one"114 and "you are to love your God and you
are to love your neighbor". 115 One loves one's neighbor, moreover, by
willing that one's neighbor flourish in the goods of human existence
already mentioned . Such nondemonstrable and per se nola principles
belong, Thomas insists, to the "first level" of naturallaw." 6
The second "grad us" or set of natural law precepts are those "that the
natural reason of every man immediately and of itself (per se) judges must
be done or not done".11 7 Such precepts are proximate conclusions from the
first nondemonstrable precepts of naturallaw. 118 They can be understood
as true, "immediately, with a modicum of reflection". 119 They are "more
determinate" than the primary precepts of natural law, since they specify
sorts of actions that human persons ought do or not do, but they can,
Thomas believes , be grasped easily by the intelligence of the most ordinary
individual. 120 Such precepts belong absolutely to naturallaw. 121 It is true
that these precepts can become perverted at times because of sin and bad
habits, and it is for this reason that they are in need of a further "edition,"
namely, through God's divinely revealed law , 122 for these are the precepts
found in the Decalogue.
The third "grad us" or set of natural law precepts is made up of those
truths about human action that are known only "by a more subtle
consideration of reason" .123 They are like conclusions derived from the
second set of precepts, 124 and they are known only to the "wise," that is ,
those in whom the virtue of prudence is perfected . To know these precepts,
"much consideration of diverse circumstances" is required, and diligently
to consider these is something that pertains to the wise, who are to instruct
those not perfected in virtue. 125
This is the "structure" of natural law found in Aquinas. Note that the
second "grad us" or set of natural law precepts includes, for Thomas, the
precepts of the Decalogue , which includes such specific moral norms as
those proscribing killing, adultery, and theft, and Thomas regarded these
specific norms as absolutely binding, so much so that not even God can
grant dispensations from them .126 Properly to understand his mind on this
matter, however, we need first to distinguish, with him, between human
acts considered in their "natural" or "physical" species and human acts
considered in their moral spec ies. Aquinas and theologians who assent to
"Humanae Vitae" clearly distinguish between these two ways of
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considering human acts . Killing an innocent person, executing a criminal.
and killing an assailant in an act of self-defense all are , in their natural or
physical species, acts of killing. 127 But for Thomas, they differ in their
moral species insofar as only the killing of an innocent person is morally
wicked or evil secundum se, 128 whereas the killing involved in executing a
criminal and defending oneselffrom an unprovoked attack by a measured
use of force are morally good actions, properly described from a moral
perspective not as acts of killing, but as acts of justice and of legitimate
self-defense. 129
The basis for this distinction is that human acts, as human and moral ,
receive their "forms" from human intelligence, which places them in their
moral species by discerning their "ends," "objects," and "circumstances".
As we have seen in the critique of revisionist natural law, Aquinas insists
that all these factors must be judged good or in accord with natural law if
the whole human act is to be morally good. The end for the sake of which
an action is done is for him a primary, indeed, the primary source of that
act's moral species, because it is only for the sake of an end that a human
person, as an intelligent being, acts to begin with.l30 It is , indeed, the
':forma magis universalis " of the whole human act in the sense that a genus
is said to be a ':forma magis universalis" with respect to its species . 13 1 But in
addition, the "object" of the external act chosen and commanded by the
will is also a primary source of the moral species of the whole human act,
precisely because this object is the object of a will act, the act of choice. It is
the "proximate end" that the acting person intends. It is not the "materia
ex qua " the external act is composed (the "natural" or "physical" species of
the act). Rather, it is the "materia circa quam" the external act is
concerned, and as such "has, as it were, the meaning of a form insofar as it
confers species" upon the act.i32 It is, one could say, the intelligible
proposal adopted by choice and executed externally (e.g., to defend onself,
to execute a criminal, to kill an innocent person). Like the end for whose
sake this object is chosen, it too must be judged good if the whole human
act is to be in the moral species of a "good" moral act.

Position on Precepts
With this distinction in mind, St. Thomas's position on the precepts of
the Decalogue is lucidly clear. He holds that these precepts of natural law,
known to be true "immediately, with a modicum of consideration," in the
light of the first and common principles of natural law. are absolute . They
proscribe absolutely the killing of the innocent, adultery, theft, and so
forth, because all these kinds of acts are contrary to specific natural law
precepts. He teaches that apparent "exceptions" to these norms are in
reality different kinds of human acts, specified by different moral objects.
Thus, Abraham did not consent to kill an innocent human being when he
was willing to obey God's command to sacrifice his son, Isaac. Rather, he
consented to carry out the just command of God. \33
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But why is it always morally wicked and contrary to natural law precepts
to kill innocent persons, to commit adultery, to steal, or to contracept? The
basic reason is that the truth of these specific moral norms of naturalla w is
grounded in its "first and common principles". Recall that for Thomas, the
twofold law of love of God and neighbor is the principle upon which the
precepts of the Decalogue are founded . What this means is that a basic
requirement of natural law is that human persons, in and through the acts
they freely choose to do, ought to manifest love for God and neighbor. If
we love God, we ought to accept from Him His good gifts , the goods
perfective of human persons, such goods as life, including bodily integrity
and health, knowledge of the truth and appreciation of beautY,personal
integrity and authenticity, harmony with others . And if we love our
neighbor, we ought to will that these goods of human existence flourish in
them and we ought not will that these goods not be in them.
The Fathers of Vatican Council II , it should be noted , suggested a basic
normativer principle of natural law similar to that proposed by St.
Thomas when he affirmed that love of God and love of neighbor are
among the "first and common principles of naturalla w". After noting that
human activity is of crucial significance not only for its results, but also
and even more importantly because it develops human persons and gives
to them, by reason of its self-determining and free character, their identity
as moral beings , the Fathers of Vatican Council II declared : "Hence, the
norm of human action is this, that in accord with the divine plan and will, it
should harmonize with the genuine good of the human race, and al:ow
men as individuals and as members of society to pursue their total vocation
and fulfill it".134 To put this another way, according to natural law we
ought, in our choices, to revere and respect the goods 0fhuman existence,
the goods to which we are directed by the primary principles of practical
reason. Our hearts are to be open to these goods perfective of human
persons. These goods are no abstractions, existing "out there"; rather, they
are perfections of human persons , aspects of their full-being, of their
dignity as human persons. Freely to choose to set them aside is to be willing
to do evil. Human persons, made in the image of the holy and triune God,
are to be, like Him, absolutely innocent of evil. God wills properly and per
se, that is, as end or means, only what is good. He permits evil, but does not
choose or do evil. 135 Like Him, we His children ought never choose or do
evil.
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